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SENTEN C IN G: THE D I LE M M A OF D I S C RE T I ON
By Jerold Israel
Prqfessor of Law, The University of Michigan
[The following excerpts are taken from Professor Jerold Israel's revision
of the late Hazel B. Kerper's Introduction to the Criminal Justice System
( West Publishing Co. 1979), with permission of the author and publisher.
Footnotes have been omitted.]
As we have seen, judges usually have substantial discretion in sentencing.
Most states give them considerable leeway in choosing between probation
and imprisonment, in setting the term of imprisonment under either an indeter
minate or determinate sentencing structure, in deciding whether a young of
fender will be given the special benefits of a youthful offender statute, and in
determining whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences for multi
ple convictions.
In some jurisdictions, judges even have the final say as to whether an ex
tended term will be imposed under a habitual offender charge. Judicial discre
tion in sentencing is one of the most hotly debated subjects in the criminal jus
tice field today. Few experts are satisfied with the present system, but there is a
sharp division among critics as to what reforms are needed. Some argue that
extensive judicial discretion is basically correct, but minor modifications would
be valuable so as to more carefully control the exercise of that discretion. Oth
ers argue that the discretion must be taken away from the judges and either
placed elsewhere or largely eliminated from the sentencing process.
To fully appreciate the issues in this crucial debate, one must have some an
swers to at least three questions. Why did we give judges extensive sentencing
discretion in the first place? What have been the advantages and disadvan
tages of judicial discretion? What alternatives are available, and what are their
advantages and disadvantages? After lengthy discussions, experts remain in
disagreement as to the appropriate response to these questions. We will at
tempt merely to summarize some of the more substantial points they have
made.
Individualizing Sentences: The Need for Discretion

We note in Chapter Five that the movement toward indeterminate sentences
(and judicial discretion) reflected an interest in accommodating the several ob
jectives of punishment. Indeterminate sentencing was designed to achieve re
habilitation as well as deterrence, to avoid needless incapacitation while still
obtaining a punishment sufficient to serve the legitimate needs of retribution.
The development of probation reflected these same concerns, although the
primary emphasis here clearly was on rehabilitation. The overall objective of
our sentencing philosophy was to make the punishment fit the offender as well
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as the offense. This was an objective that required individualized sentencing
based upon the facts of the individual case. It was an objective that lent itself
naturally to broad judicial discretion.
There are those today who contend that our emphasis on rehabilitation has
been misplaced -- not because it is an inappropriate goal, but because it re
mains largely beyond our capacity. Yet even if this controversial premise is ac
cepted, the need for individualized sentencing hardly disappears. If one looks
to incapacitation, deterrence, or even retribution, there is still need for individu
alization. Let us consider, for example, five cases of kidnapping. No. 1 is a
woman whose baby died, and who took another woman·s baby from the hos
pital. No.2 is a young man whose girlfriend said she was breaking up with him.
He put her in a car and drove her around for 24 hours trying to persuade her to
change her mind, while her frantic parents tried to locate them and the girl did
everything she could to get away. No. 3 is a divorced man who took his own
child from its mother who had legal custody and refused to tell the mother
where the child was. No. 4 is a kidnapper for ransom who kept a young woman
buried in a box fitted with air tubes for breathing in order to make it impossible
for searchers to find her, and who demanded $200,000 from her wealthy father.
No. 5 is a woman accomplice of the kidnapper for ransom. She assisted in the
kidnapping because she was in love with the kidnaper and was also threatened
by him. She did everything she could to keep the kidnapped girl alive when it
was possible for her to do so.
The offense charged in each of our five cases is identical -- kidnapping. The
legislature has drawn some general distinctions in defining that crime, but it
can hardly take into consideration all of the factors that distinguish one kidnap
ping from another and one person's participation from that of his accomplice.
Even if one were concerned only with retribution, somebody must be given au
thority to distinguish between these five cases. The evil in each is hardly equiva
lent to the others even though the same crime is involved. A sanction as severe
as imprisonment should not be imposed without drawing more careful lines
that relate to our retribution objective. Of course, once we add consideration of
deterrence and some degree of rehabilitation, we must consider more factors
and there is even greater need for individualization. In sum, individualization
probably would not be as essential if we had fewer punishment objectives and
they did not so frequently clash, but even if we shifted our focus so that deter
rence or retribution became the dominant theme -- as some say we should
a certain amount of individualization (and hence discretion) would still be need
ed.
-

Factors Affecting Judicial Discretion

How in fact have judges utilized the discretion they have received? Have
they emphasized factors that relate to the several goals of punishment? Most
experts believe that they have done so, although many would say that there has
been too much emphasis on one factor or another. While the weight given to
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particular factors varies with the judge, almost all judges have tended to look to
the same basic elements. The first, and probably the most significant, is the
seriousness of the offense as it was carried out. As we saw in our five kidnap
ping cases, the gravity of the actor's wrongdoing is not always revealed simply
by the punishment category in which the legislature places the particular crime.
A sentencing court will want to know if the case involved special aggravating
circumstances that made the defendant's conduct more serious than that of
other offenders who commit the same crime. Though a violent act is not a for
mal element of the crime charged, did the defendant here actually threaten
harm to his victim? Did he involve minors in the commission of the crime? Did
he pick upon a victim who was particularly vulnerable? Did the planning, so
phistication or professionalism of the crime indicate premeditation? On the
other side, the court also will want to know if the case involved special mitigat
ing factors that suggest a lower sentence: the defendant may have been a pas
sive participant or may have played a minor role in committing the crime; the
defendant may have exercised special caution to avoid harming the victim; the
defendant may have acted under the influence of alcohol orextreme emotional
stress; or the victim may have been an initiator or provoker of the incident. Our
list of mitigating and aggravating factors is not complete, but only illustrative.
As we have noted, several of the recently adopted determinate sentencing pro
visions include lists of specific aggravating and mitigating factors to be consid
ered by the judge.
Judges also will look to the character and background of the defendant. Has
he been convicted of previous offenses? Has he "served time" before? Has he
engaged in a pattern of violent conduct which suggests that he poses a serious
danger to society? What is his attitude towards this crime.:.._ has he pled guilty,
made restitution to the victim, assisted the police in convictin g his accom
plices? Does he have a social stability indicating that he may be able to stay out
of trouble? Relevant factors here include his family ties, employment record,
possible addiction to drugs, and the character of his friends and associates.
Many judges are concerned that such factors tend to discriminate among so
cio-economic classes, favoring in particular the defendant from a middle
class community. However, available evidence suggests that such offenders
are less likely to repeat certain types of offenses (e.g., burglaries) than other
prisoners who have far less to look forward to when they are returned to the
community.
Another factor likely to influence the judge is the community attitude toward
the crime and the offender. If there is special community fear of the particular
type of crime, or outrage as to the particular case before the court, the judge
may feel that the community's demand for retribution or deterrence should be
reflected in his sentence. Reviewing a sentence of two years imprisonment and
five years suspended sentence for two counts of forcible rape, the Supreme
Court of Alaska rejected that sentence because it failed to give sufficient weight
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to "community condemnation of the offender's anti-social conduct." The trial
court had relied primarily upon the defendant's potential for rehabilitation, but
the Alaska Supreme Court stressed that the interest did not justify ignoring the
need for "the reaffirmation of societal norms, for the purpose of maintaining re
spect for the norms." In light of that need, the sentence was too lenient: "A sub
stantially longer period of actual confinement was called for ... [so as to] bring
home to [the defendant] the serious nature and consequences of his crime and
to reaffirm society's condemnation of violent and forcible rape."
The judge's exercise of discretion in sentencing also is likely to be in
fluenced by his perspective of the state's corrections system. The nature of
prison life and prison programs may be a deciding factor in choosing between
probation or imprisonment or in setting the term of imprisonment. When there
still is some hope for rehabilitation, and the judge views the prison system as
almost inevitably having a negative impact on an offender, the judge is more
likely to turn to probation. Where the judge has decided on imprisonment. the
conditions under which time will be served may influence his determination as
to the appropriate minimum term. Life in an antiquated, maximum security pris
on obviously is somewhat different than life in a modern, minimum security in
stitution. The judge may be impressed (or depressed) by the prison system's
rehabilitative programs. Where he has some confidence in those programs, he
may hesitate to impose a high minimum for fear that it will interfere with the pa
role of the prisoner at that point when he is most likely to achieve a successful
return to the community. Judges are aware that holding a prisoner beyond that
point may be counterproductive. It can lead to bitterness and a reinforcement
of the attitudes which led the offender to prison in the first place. On the other
hand, if the judge believes that the corrections system offers little hope of reha
bilitation or that the parole board takes too many unjustifiable risks, he may be
inclined to impose a higher minimum sentence.
Judges also take into consideration the impact of the sentence upon the ad
ministration of an overburdened criminal justice system. They recognize that if
concessions are not given for guilty pleas, the backlog of cases to be tried may
grow so heavy as to almost cause the system to collapse. They also recognize
that, where prisons are overcrowded and new prisons are not being built, the
parole board may be in a position where it is forced to release a prisoner for
every new prisoner it receives. In such situations, high maximum terms are
meaningless. Prisoners will be released long before their full terms are served
(even without consideration of liberal good time allowances). Indeed, a high
minimum may be unwise even though the judge is confident that this offender
should be incapacitated for a substantial period of time. The judge has no way
of comparing this offender to others that the parole board also must consider
for possible release. Assuming that overcrowding will require the parole board
to release some prisoners who are far from good risks, the judge may hesitate
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to tie the board·s hands with a high minimum. thereby possibly forcing it to take
an even greater risk in paroling a less deserving prisoner.
THE THE O RY OF DISC RETI ON IN THE
FE DE R A L RU LE S OF EVI DENCE
By Thomas M. Mangler
Assistant Professor of Law. University of Illinois
This is one of those issues. of which there are so many during a
trial. where a judge is within legal boundaries no matter what he
does. The authorities support a ruling for either side.
Scott Turow. Presumed Innocent
Few commentators have examined the theory of judicial discretion in the
Federal Rules of Evidence and that theory's implications for the roles of trial and
appellate courts. The few who have examined the issue claim that the Federal
Rules' policy granting the trial court substantial flexibility is somehow tied to the
overriding philosophy of the rules, which favors admitting all relevant evidence.
Indeed, one commentator regards judicial discretion and broad admissibility
as causally linked: "Three words describe the direction in which the Federal
Rules of Evidence have taken us: discretion, creativity, and admissibility. The
codes give abundant discretionary power to the trial courts. The judges add a
sizable measure of interpretive creativity. Greater admissibility has resulted."
Undoubtedly, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence were guided in
part by a policy favoring the admission of all relevant evidence. On its face.
however, the linking of discretion and liberal admissibility seems misguided.
Given a decent amount of flexibility, a trial judge may exclude--as easily as ad
mit--evidence.
Other reasons motivated the drafters to build flexibility into the Federal
Rules. Their views on trial court discretion derive. not from any thoughts about
admissibility, but from an awareness of limitations concerning trial judges, co
dified rules of evidence. and the trial process itself. First. the drafters believed
that evidence, arguably more than any other field of the law. calls for trial judges
to make quick decisions. One consequence of ruling on the run is that evi
dence law must be simple and accessible. Another consequence is that re
gardless of the specificity or the generality of a particular rule, a trial judge, how
ever knowledgeable and well-intentioned, will sometimes make the wrong call
under the time pressure of an ongoing trial.
Second. the drafters believed that the trial process itself and the traditional
rules of evidence are imperfect tools in getting at the truth of a particular contro
versy. Each trial tells its own tale, raises unique evidentiary concerns, and con
sequently calls for individual treatment. All things considered. trial procedures.
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including evidentiary rules, provide litigants with an acceptably fair means for
resolving their dispute. But few believe--least of all the drafters of the Federal
Rules--that detailed evidence rules can be devised which, if mechanically
applied, would be appropriate for every controversy.
Third, the drafters understood that evidence decisions frequently call for a
delicate balancing ofthe probative value of an item of evidence against its pre
judicial effect. Most, though certainly not all, rules of evidence are designed to
limit the prejudicial effect of certain evidence in the minds of jurors or to prevent
them from overvaluing it. But the rules accomplish these goals only imperfect
ly; because of the stronger value favoring admissibility of relevant evidence,
sometimes a great amount of prejudice is injected into a trial. Moreover, as
sessing the possible prejudicial effect of evidence is often a difficult task. At
best, this nebulous inquiry into the minds of a handful of lay people involves a
great deal of guesswork. The drafters understood, therefore, that trial judges
need some guidance here, but additionally require the flexibility to mitigate and
apportion among the litigants the harmful effects of prejudicial evidence.
Taken together, these considerations argue for an evidence code that
strikes "a middle course between vague generalities and constricting particu
larity." These are the words of Professor Edward W. Cleary, the Reporter to the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, and they describe well
the style of those rules. This Article contends that the architects of this "middle
course" intended to give some guidance, through specific rules, to trial courts
and litigants so that the trial process would be sufficiently predictable. None
theless, the drafters sought to provide enough play in the joints to permit the
trial court to consider the cumulative effect of the close prejudice and reliability
rulings and to split them fairly among the parties. In a civil trial, fair apportion
ment may simply mean evenhanded treatment of all litigants. In a criminal trial,
fair apportionment may mean more than splitting the close calls; it may require
sensitivity to the criminal defendant's opportunity to present his case. In both
situations, the Federal Rules envision the trial judge as umpire or referee, trying
to keep fair a fast-paced and hotly contested adversary match. Finally, a code
of general guidelines like the Federal Rules, while permitting an appellate court
to forgive the occasional trial error, also gives appellate judges some sound
doctrinal basis for checking whether the trial judge has run an acceptably fair
trial. ...
The Policy Of Discretion In The Federal Rules

Professor Rosenberg has taught us that we should think about judicial dis
cretion in two senses. In one sense, the focus is on the range of alternatives
available to the trial judge. If a rule legitimately grants to the trial judge two or
more alternatives, the trial judge retains decision-liberating discretion. In the
second sense, the focus is on the appellate court's review power. If the appel
late court's review power is narrow, the trial court's discretion consequently is
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great. In Rosenberg's words, when the appellate court is precluded from re
viewing the trial court, or does so only under an abuse of discretion standard,
the trial court has been granted" a right to be wrong without incurring reversal."
Thus, a trial court may have discretion either because a rule provides a range of
choices or because, although the rule itself seems not to provide alternatives,
the appellate court's review of the trial court's interpretation is narrow.
Of course, both senses of discretion--the trial court's decision-liberating
discretion and the appellate court's review-limiting discretion--vary in degree.
Some rules on their face may not limit a trial court's discretion in any way. For
example, Rule 49 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants the trial court
unbridled discretion to require a jury to return, not a general verdict resolving
liability and fixing damages, but only a special verdict in the form of written an
swers to specific questions. The Rule provides absolutely no guidance regard
ing whether and when a trial court should employ special verdicts, and thereby
implies that a court can employ special verdicts whenever it wants.
Other rules provide what might be called guided discretion to the trial judge.
A rule that provides guided discretion grants some flexibility to the judge, but
restrains the choices by somewhat specific guidelines to which the judge must
adhere. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for instance, provides
that a party usually can amend a pleading only by leave of court, and "leave
shall be freely granted when justice so requires." One might quarrel with wheth
er use of the word "justice" provides much, if any, guidance. It is more than
nothing, however, and although Rule 15's vagueness gives some discretion to
the trial court, it also affirmatively directs the court generally to allow the parties
to amend their pleadings.
Similarly, the standards of appellate review also may vary greatly in the
amount of discretion afforded the trial court. On purely legal issues, the appel
late court does not defer at all to the trial court. On issues of fact or mixed law
and fact, the trial court can afford to be "wrong" as long as it is not clearly erro
neous or abusive. On a few issues. the appellate court will not review the trial
court's decision at all.
On questions of admissibility, the Federal Rules of Evidence--considered
individually and as jointly applied--provide substantial discretion to trial
judges. Their generality alone gives trial courts some discretion by creating at
their fringes a penumbra of debatable meaning. Further, the harmless error rule
enhances trial court discretion by directing the appellate courts to give the trial
court a limited right to be wrong without incurring reversal. As following sec
tions of this Article reveal, the drafters of the Federal Rules infused flexibility into
trial court decision-making in other ways. Uniformly, however. the court's dis
cretion is guided. Even the most general rules--the relevancy rule and the un
fair prejudice rule--provide standards for admissibility. Thus, Chairman Jen
ner's description of the Federal Rules as providing play in the joints is accurate.
While the Rules contain a good measure of flexibility, they nonetheless provide
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principles or guides on which the trial court can rest a ruling--even if, as in Rule
406, those guidelines sometimes point in different directions. In so doing, the
Rules guide litigants and trial courts, by infusing some predictability into evi
dence rulings. The Rules also provide a handle by which appellate courts can
get a feel for the fairness of the trial.
In the following discussion, this Article shows that the Advisory Committee
selected the form of a general code in order to provide a broad measure of dis
cretion and demonstrates how the drafters implemented this policy in a variety
of ways. The section therefore buttresses this Article's suggestion that Rule
406's flexibility might be deliberate and, more generally, that the policy of judi
cial discretion under the Federal Rules is motivated by wholly different con
cerns than the Rules' policy in favor of admissibility.
A Handy Pamphlet: The Rules' Form
One of the Federal Rules' most striking features is that they encompass
about two hundred pages--if the Advisory Committee Notes and pertinent leg
islative history are included--and under forty pages if they are not. What even
tually took Wigmore nine volumes of text is reduced to what Chairman Jenner
called a "handy pamphlet." It is equally striking that neither the Advisory Com
mittee Notes nor the legislative history contains any extensive discussion or de
bate concerning the Advisory Committee's choice of this general form. Howev
er, close examination of these materials and two earlier codification
attempts--the 1942 Model Code of Evidence and the 1953 Uniform Rules of
Evidence--demonstrates that the Advisory Committee chose the form of a
general code for the same reasons as the drafters of the Model Code and Uni
form Rules: to address the proper balance of trial court discretion and appellate
review. . . .
A Limited Right to be Wrono
The harmless error rule underlines the imperfections of the trial as truth pro
moter. The rule acknowledges that some evidence rulings are inherently diffi
cult calls, both because evidence rules are imperfect tools and because a trial
court must make evidence rulings quickly. By making evidentiary errors
grounds for reversal only if they affect a substantial right of the party, the harm
less error rule tells losing litigants they have no cause to complain if they were
able to present the core of their case fairly to the factfinder, without too much
prejudice poisoning their presentation.
The rule also speaks to appellate courts by cautioning them to give trial
courts some right to be wrong, except perhaps for constitutional error. The rule
urges them to evaluate the strength of the evidence on each side and the trial's
outcome to determine whether any error may have affected the final judgment.
This is the appellate court's straightforward task when the trial court has wrong
ly excluded a litigant's evidence. To determine if the exclusion mattered at trial,
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the appellate court must evaluate whether the evidence addressed significant
issues in the case and, assuming the evidence went to an important issue,
whether other evidence adequately presented the issue to the jury. Similarly,
when the trial court wrongly has admitted unreliable evidence or reliable evi
dence that is inadmissible on policy grounds extrinsic to the trial, the appellate
court must check whether the error affected the final judgment.
When the alleged error is the trial court's admission of unfairly prejudicial ev
idence, the appellate court's task is significantly different. The appellate court
must review the alleged error, other evidence admitted on the same issue, and
the trial court's other prejudice rulings--to the extent they are present in the
record. Unfair prejudice cannot be weighed in a vacuum, but requires the ap
pellate court to look at all of the prejudice injected into the trial by both litigants.
The appellate court must try to obtain from the cold record some feel for whe
ther the trial court tried to minimize the prejudice suffered by the complaining
litigant and sought to apportion the prejudice fairly among the litigants.
If the trial court made the majority of its prejudice rulings in accordance with
Rule 403's balancing formula, rather than under specific exclusionary rules, the
appellate court's ability to review suffers because of the court's remoteness
from the heat and fury of trial. In these circumstances, because of the trial
court's closer perspective, the appellate court frequently is reduced to affirm
ing the trial court in blind faith. Reversal is typically possible only if the appellate
court can ascertain that the trial court showed bias by uniformly opening the
door to prejudice against one of the litigants, without doing the same for the
other litigant when presented with a similar opportunity. The appellate court in
other words may be unable to assess the fairness of a single Rule 403 ruling,
but may be competent to evaluate a handful of them, especially if the trial court
resolved all or most of them against one side. The Fifth Circuit's decision in H. E.
Collins v. Wayne Corp. is noteworthy in recognizing this obligation to consider
the cumulative effect of evidentiary errors. There the court acknowledged that
"the combination of several errors may require reversal even though each error
by itself may have been harmless."
The appellate court may have a better handle if the trial court's rulings allow
ing the infusion of prejudice or unreliability into the case are based on specific
exclusionary rules like the character, habit, hearsay, and impeachment rules.
As noted previously, each of the Federal Rules, though vague at the edges, has
a core of meaning. To the extent the trial court clearly misreads a specific exclu
sionary rule·s core of meaning, the trial court has committed error. Under these
circumstances, the appellate court can reverse if the error by itself is egregious
in prejudicing the litigant or is one of several such errors indicating that the trial
court failed to run an acceptably fair trial either through ignorance or bias. The
appellate court, having identified one clear but not egregious error, can also
legitimately reverse if it finds that the trial court on all or most of the other close
prejudice rulings, ruled against the complaining litigant--even if, viewed singly,
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those rulings could not be regarded as erroneous. Here again, the appellate
court may be able to determine, from the totality of rulings, that the trial court
was not fair or evenhanded in overloading one litigant with all the prejudice.
Each of these scenarios is rare, and they were intended to be rare. They
jointly convey that the drafters of the Federal Rules envisioned a limited appel
late role. Only when a trial court commits constitutional error did the drafters
envision that appellate review might be plenary. These scenarios also jointly
convey that appellate court rulings are unreliable indicators as to which objec
tions will prevail on appeal. Because the harmless error rule tells the appellate
courts to base their decisions on a gestalt view of the overall fairness of each
trial, appellate evidence decisions usually do not tell third parties what counts
as reversible error. By its operation, the harmless error rule consequently takes
some of the ruleness out of the Federal Rules.
Because the harmless error rule tells appellate courts to look chiefly at
whether the trial court has run an acceptably fair trial, the principal message to
trial courts is the same. The notion of harmless error does not mean that trial
courts have free rein to make evidence rulings capriciously without regard to
the language of specific rules. But it does convey that on those discretionary
issues in which a trial court may be within legal boundaries no matter what it
does, the trial court's chief concern should be whether each litigant has had an
opportunity to present the core of her case and has borne only her fair share of
the prejudice that frequently accompanies probative evidence. By so doing,
the trial court runs a fair trial under the Federal Rules and avoids reversal.
The Federal Rules' Overall Policy
This Article has shown that the drafters adopted the middle course in order
to set the appropriate balance for trial court discretion and appellate review.
That balance--which overwhelmingly tips in favor of trial courts--is found in a
variety of places; not only in the Federal Rules' loosely textured style, but also in
Rule 403's discretionary weighing, the pick-and-choose options provided in a
few rules, particularly Rule 406, the catchall exception, and the harmless error
rule. As this Article has shown, the flexibility of the Federal Rules--in all its vari
ous costumes--provides trial courts with the means to distribute fairly among
the litigants the close prejudice and reliability decisions.
The Federal Rules' middle course raises at least three other implications for
trial court discretion and appellate review. First, the Federal Rules of Evidence
are intended to provide some guidance to trial courts and litigants, but cannot
be consulted for the definitive answers to many questions. Jointly the Rules
lend some predictability to the trial process, probably more so than the com
mon law of evidence had done. But their predictability quotient is not high. Liti
gants typically come to court uncertain about the admissibility of at least some
of their critical evidence. As this Article has shown, a number of factors contrib
ute to that unpredictability.
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Second, the drafters intended that the Federal Rules' generality and flexibil
ity should perpetuate. In part, the drafters' flexibility choice was based on their
understanding that evidence issues call for quick decision-making. Even if ac
ceptable, detailed rules could be discovered, the drafters understood that their
sheer volume would undermine both a trial's efficiency and accuracy. In part
too, the drafters· choice was based on their belief that each trial is unique and
calls for discrete resolution. As this Article has shown, the Advisory Committee
intended to give trial courts the maneuverability to craft its rulings to do individu
al justice. To that extent, the Committee members were not platonic rational
ists. The members did not believe there can be ideal evidence rules that trial
courts can apply mechanically. The Committee was comprised of former and
practicing trial lawyers who understood the nature of jury trials and believed
that drafting acceptable specific rules to answer most evidence questions was
impossible.
Third, the drafters intended a minor role for appellate courts in deciding evi
dence questions. The harmless error rule conveys this message most clearly.
But for its duty to scrutinize closely for constitutional errors, the appellate
court's proper role under the Federal Rules is limited to checking the trial's
overall fairness. The Rules seek to accomplish that purpose by marking a few
bright lines by which appellate courts can gauge the trial's fairness, and by en
couraging reversal only when the appellate court is convinced that the eviden
tiary errors, considered collectively, have affected the outcome of trial. Further,
the drafters did not intend for the appellate courts to become rulemakers them
selves by establishing binding precedents that narrow or focus the Federal
Rules' general language. Appellate fine-tuning of the Federal Rules is incon
sistent with the drafters' purpose.lt undermines the loosely textured style of the
Rules and the trial court's flexibility afforded by that lack of rigidity. Additionally,
taken to its extreme, appellate narrowing undermines the "Handy-pamphlet"
notion and creates an elaborate and unworkable common law of evidence. Fi
nally, appellate fine-tuning bespeaks a rationalism about the trial process not
shared by the drafters who believed a fair but imperfect trial was all that was
possible. Thus, appellate judges who see their function under the Federal
Rules as equivalent to their interpretive, gap-filling function under substantive
statutory schemes are mistaken.
A Defense Of Th e Federal Rules' Policy
The only viable alternative to the Federal Rules' middle course is a more de
tailed code that restricts trial court discretion by containing specific answers to
all or almost all evidence questions. We have grown either too wise or too dis
trustful to place unfettered discretion in trial judges. Thus, Charles Clark's pro
posal of a creed, if seriously considered in 1940, deserves no consideration
less that fifty years later.
Like the Advisory Committee, we probably also are too wise to consider
even attempting a more detailed evidence code like the one supported by
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Dean Wigmore. Foremost among the reasons is the impossibility of the task.
Given the enormous variety of possible evidentiary situations, drafting a code
addressing even most evidence issues is probably impossible. Moreover, ad
dressing only most of the issues would be insufficient. If the goals are to pro
vide mechanical answers to evidence questions and to reduce trial court dis
cretion, a code claiming to be complete, but in reality falling short of
completeness, would succeed only partly on both scores. Arguably, such a
code would create a greater evil by providing absolutely no guidance to the trial
court on the unanswered questions. Thus, the project itself is a chimera. For
that reason alone, the Advisory Committee's choice of a loosely textured code
seems a wise one. Even assuming, however--against our best intuitions--the
theoretical possibility of a closed and complete evidence code, it is far from ob
vious that such a code would be more effective than the Federal Rules in pro
moting the pertinent values of truth promotion, predictability, or fairness. The
following sections examine the extent to which a loosely textured code effec
tively promoted these values.
Truth Promotion
Looking back at the historical experience of the common law's categorical
exclusionary rules, the drafters of the Federal Rules had no reason to accept
the empirical claim that detailed evidence rules promote the truth more effec
tively than flexible, loosely textured rules. Less than fifteen years later, there is
no good reason to question the drafters' judgment. As a general matter, rules
allowing room for a trial judge's sensitivity to the complexity and uniqueness of
a particular case necessarily should promote truth more than rules providing
for only mechanical application of a closed and complete system. Mechanical
rules restrain a trial judge's access to factors that might lead to the best resolu
tion of a particular case. This general maxim about the dangers of formalism is
particularly true for evidence law. Most, though not all, evidence issues raise
concerns either about the reliability of an item of evidence or about its probative
value balanced against its prejudicial effect. This inquiry is necessarily trial spe
cific. No closed and complete system can promote truth as well as rules that
allow judges to consider all the legal issues and factual evidence, the unique
emotional aura of the trial, the jurors' intelligence, and the peculiar identities of
the parties, who frequently bring to court the prejudicial baggage of their lives.
No closed and complete system can accommodate a trial judge's cumulative
assessment of the total prejudice injected into a particular trial against one or
both litigants.
The foregoing discussion assumes that excellent judges, wisely sensitive to
the complexity of a case and capable of considering its features, are making
the evidence calls. But even if one assumes instead that mediocre judges are
applying an evidence code, the outcome is not obviously different. No empiri
cal evidence exists to suggest that a mediocre judge does better under a
closed and complete system of rules than under one allowing some discretion-
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ary weighing. It is hard to know how to assess this question without any empiri
cal evidence, in part because of the difficulty of imagining how detailed a code
would have to be in order to be closed and complete. But given the enormous
variety of evidence issues, one reasonably can assume that even a code that
restricted a trial court's discretion only substantially, not entirely, would contain
hundreds of rules. On that assumption, we can consider some obvious prob
lems with an enormously detailed code.
One problem is that mediocre judges could make at least as many errors
interpreting specific language as they would applying loosely textured lan
guage. Another problem is that mediocre judges also commit errors of mis
application; sometimes, because sophisticated lawyers lead them astray by in
tentionally mispackaging an offer of evidence, judges apply the wrong rule.
The more detailed the code, the more opportunities there will be for attorney
mislabeling, thereby making judicial misinterpretation and misapplication er
rors more likely. Thus, it is not clear that a closed and complete evidence code
promotes the truth better than a loosely-textured code--even with mediocre
judges.
One might object, however, on grounds that the discretionary balancing
which the Federal Rules frequently require is often guesswork; there is no rea
son to think that trial judges, whatever their intellectual capacities, evercan bal
ance accurately the probative value of one item of evidence against its prejudi
cial effects, much less weigh and apportion fairly a number of items. Indeed,
one empirical study has claimed that judges, as well as lawyers and jurors,
have widely disparate views about what constitutes prejudicial evidence. Thus,
the argument goes, because we have so little confidence in judges' abilities to
engage in this kind of balancing, mechanical rules setting the balance, howev
er imperfectly, are preferable to discretionary rules.
Even assuming, however, that sometimes different people balance differ
ently, the nihilistic claims advanced above prove too much. The same con
cerns over whether individual judges can balance accurately also necessarily
question whether a small group of rulemakers could frame acceptable rules. If
the empirical studies suggest that no one can agree on prejudice, as between a
judge who misbalances and a rule that does the same, we are left with no good
choice. More importantly, however, there is no reason to accept this nihilistic
perspective. Balancing is not so unfathomable. Balancing probativeness
against prejudice is about fairness and evenhandedness.If we are that dubious
about judges' intellectual capacities to be fair, we need to rethink our entire ju
risprudence, not just our rules of evidence.
Thus, those who argue for more detail in the Federal Rules cannot justify
their proposals on grounds that a more detailed code necessarily fosters great
er accuracy. Proponents for more detail must argue that a closed and complete
code enhances other values--chiefly, increased predictability and greater fair
ness at the trial court level through enhanced appellate review. But a detailed
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evidence code fails as a panacea for the uncertainties of trial or the dangers of
an evil trial judge.
Predictability
Some predictability necessarily flows from a code of rules that is both acces
sible and uniform. By being understandable to litigants, as well as to courts,
and by providing that courts should treat similar instances in a similar way, such
a code allows parties to know ahead of time how a trial court will decide their
cases. The importance of predictability in the law should be obvious. In sub
stantive areas, for example, in order to decide whether to enter into a transac
tion or engage in certain behavior, people need to know beforehand the conse
quences of their actions, including the legal consequences of those actions.
Some commentators believe that strong predictability in evidence law is also
important. Indeed, as noted previously, the alleged unpredictability of Mor
gan's 1942 Model Code was principal cause of Wigmore's dissenting vote.
Settlement Promotion
One might regard the primary value of predictability in evidence rules to be
its capacity to promote settlement. Litigants, civil or criminal, need to under
stand the trial process ahead of time in order to decide whether to litigate. The
decision to litigate or to settle is based in part on the likelihood of prevailing at
trial. If the parties are uncertain about the probable outcome of litigation, they
will be less likely to settle.
The Federal Rules of Evidence are not without some predictive value. Liti
gants, for example, know ahead of trial that all relevant evidence generally will
be admissible, and that prejudicial material generally will be excluded only if its
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. Litigants also
know the core meaning of some of the specific Federal Rules. The drafters
marked some bright lines. But this Article has demonstrated that on many of
the close prejudice or reliability rulings, the trial court has wide discretion to ad
mit or exclude. The effect of this discretion is that sometimes a litigant cannot
reasonably surmise ahead of trial whether the trial court will admit or exclude
the evidence. A reasonable question to ask is whether the Federal Rules' un
predictability matters, and if so, whether a detailed code might enhance pre
dictability.
The answer to both these questions is probably not. First, the unpredictabil
ity of the Federal Rules of Evidence arguably does not inhibit settlement in more
than a de minimis degree. The presence of a variety of factors more significant
ly contributes to a litigant's uncertainties about the outcome of trial. Disputes
over the legal issues in the case and their resolution under the substantive law,
disagreement among the parties about the real facts of the case, and uncer
tainty about the idiosyncrasies of the factfinders contribute more substantially
to the unpredictability of trial than the uncertainties associated with federal evi-
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dence law. Moreover, some commentators have shown that a little uncertainty
about the likely result of litigation actually may induce parties to settle. Thus,
even assuming that the vagueness of the Federal Rules contributes to the un
certainties of trial, it is an open question whether that degree of uncertainty ac
tually inhibits settlement. Finally, given that the vast majority of cases settle
without going to trial and that this figure has remained constant over time, our
society appears not to be deterred from settling due the flexibility of the Federal
Rules.
Second, even assuming that the unpredictability of the Federal Rules does
inhibit settlement to some extent, a detailed evidence code may not foster
settlement any more effectively. As previously noted, a detailed code would be
many times longer than the Federal Rules. A code so elaborate might make it
difficult for litigants and courts to identify certain items of evidence as instances
of a given rule, and it would provide lawyers with opportunities to mispackage
certain evidence in the guise of something else. The effect of greater detail, giv
en the haste with which a trial court must make an evidence ruling, would be
more interpretive error. Further, assuming that the goal of the trial process un
der the detailed code would still be a fair trial, not a perfect trial, appellate courts
would be required either to overlook a technical misinterpretation or to forgive it
under a harmless error standard. Under a detailed code then, predictability
would be undermined by frequent trial court errors--at least more frequent
than a flexible code like the Federal Rules--and by the appellate court's for
giveness of trial court errors. Even assuming that greater predictability in evi
dence might enhance settlement, it is not intuitively obvious that a detailed evi
dence code would increase the amount of predictability in the trial process
substantially more than the Federal Rules.
Efficient Adjudication
One might argue that a second reason for predictability in evidence rules is
to promote pretrial adjudication. Greater detail in rules might allow trial courts
to resolve more cases at the summary judgment stage. Because the trial court
could assess more easily what evidence would count at trial, it could more easi
ly decide whether any material facts would be in dispute.
But the efficiencies are doubtful here because of the number of cases in
which the evidence admissible at trial does not raise a material fact dispute.
Moreover, encouraging the trial court routinely to make preliminary evidentiary
rulings at the summary judgment stage will cut significantly into the court's lim
ited time. Most likely the trial court's total expenditure of time spent making evi
dence rulings on unsuccessful summary judgments would be excessive. Any
efficiencies gained by promoting pretrial adjudication would be offset at least,
and probably outweighed, by fruitless rulings on unsuccessful summary judg
ment motions.
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Additionally, it could be argued that detailed rules might reduce trial time by
reducing the number of evidentiary objections. The assumption here would be
that if evidence rules speak to all possible contingencies. there should be fewer
objections. But fewer objections will result only if the rules are clear and acces
sible. Because, as noted, a closed and complete evidence code would be volu
minous. the misapplication opportunities would be great. Our collective experi
ence should persuade us that good lawyers will find ample litigation
opportunities with detailed, as well as with general, codification.
fairness in the Trial Court
Behind some of the demands for detailed procedural rules and less trial
court discretion is the specter of an evil genius, the biased to unprincipled trial
judge. The pat, but nonetheless sound, response to these demands is that pro
cedural rules should not be drafted with the most incompetent or evil judge in
mind. Rulemaking is about ordering society in the best way possible. Even if
rulemaking is not grounded entirely on hope for a better way, it proceeds, as it
should, on the assumption that people charged with implementing the rules
will do so in a responsible way. Moreover, no evidence rules can impede a trial
judge bent on mistreating a litigant. Particularly in the context of an ongoing
trial, a biased judge can abuse a litigant in a variety of subtle and largely unre
viewable ways. The judge's demeanor, tone of voice, and facial expressions
toward the party and the jury, as well as toward the party's counsel and wit
nesses, can poison that person in the jurors' minds. A trial judge also can mis
treat a litigant by intentionally reaching erroneous rulings. Indeed, a federal dis
trict court is not harmed in any way by the occasional reversal. The losing
litigant, however, is forced to undertake a costly appeal and second trial, often
before the same judge. No rules, however detailed, can prevent unethical trial
judges from treating litigants unfairly.
This does not mean that our procedural rules should place blind faith in trial
judges; nor do they. Indeed, as the Federal Rules of Evidence themselves pro
vide, rules should contain detail sufficient to enable reviewing courts to evalu
ate whether litigants have received a fair shake. By containing some specific
rules and by allowing appellate courts, in accordance with the harmless error
rule, to evaluate the effect of all errors on the trial's outcome, the Federal Rules
seek to ensure that litigants will not suffer either from a trial court's ignorance or
from its bias. Although the appellate courts cannot always prevent the evil jurist
from mistreating a litigant, they should be able to reverse the trial court's mis
conduct to the extent it is on the record. The premise of the Federal Rules is that
there is enough specificity to allow appellate courts to evaluate whether the trial
court has run an acceptably fair trial.
No more should be expected of an evidence code. Some might quibble with
whether the federal Rules provide enough detail to allow appellate courts to
evaluate a trial's fairness. But the absence of any loud roar from the litigation
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community suggests that the Federal Rules of Evidence generally promote a
fair, but perhaps not perfect, trial.
The Wisdom of the Drafters· Choices
Defending an existing code, warts and all, against an alternative, unrealized
dream is speculative at best. [This article] has attempted to do so by question
ing the theoretical possibility of the alternative and by showing that the pur
ported advantages in having a more detailed evidence code are not intuitively
obvious. The burden, of course, is on the proponents of more systematic de
tail. We have little reason to believe that a closed and complete code is even
possible. Nor do we have any reason to believe that such a code, even if possi
ble, would be more likely to promote settlement or enhance a trial's search for
an accurate, efficient, and fair outcome. Until proponents of more precision
and less trial court discretion demonstrate their value, we should feel comfort
able that the Advisory Committee made a sound choice in opting for a flexible,
middle course.
Conclusion
Sometimes trial judges appear to distribute the close prejudice and reliabil
ity rulings fairly among the parties. This Article has attempted to show that when
a trial court balances its rulings to ensure that both litigants have had an oppor
tunity to present their cases fairly, it acts in accordance with the intent of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. For above all, the Federal Rules intended to give
trial judges considerable leeway in making evidentiary decisions.
Sometimes appellate judges appear to give relatively short shrift to evi
dence issues, by finding no error in summary fashion or by forgiving a trial
court's error as harmless. When the appellate court paints with this conclusory
brush from a belief that the trial court has run an acceptably fair trial, the appel
late court adopts its proper role. Indeed, the appellate court's typical brief di
gression from the substantive issues in the case rightly conveys to trial courts
and litigants thatthe Federal Rules of Evidence are a flexible guide of principles,
not a code etched in granite.

